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THE FIRSTNESS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
EDMOND CAIINt
ONIE'S sympathy goes out to young James Madison in the fall of 1788. After
the strenuous labors of the Constitutional Convention, he had traversed a series
of anxious stages on the road to ratification. The state conventions (except
in North Carolina and Rhode Island) had ultimately voted approval, but sev-
eral of them-including his own Virginia-had exacted a promise that amend-
ments would be adopted promptly to declare the people's fundamental liberties.
When the initial Congress under the new Constitution convened in the spring
of 1789, Madison knew, it would be watched with suspicion and distrust until
the pledge was redeemed and the amendments submitted to the states.' The
enterprise was to be his, as leader in the House of Representatives-to as-
semble the multifarious state proposals, organize them in rational order and
guide them through. He understood that some reassuring action was inevi-
table: to this he was bound in honor and reconciled in thought. But a vague,
general expectation was scarcely enough for a mind as analytical as his. He
foresaw that while the Constitution's adversaries might wreck the whole fabric
by submitting destructive amendments, the arrogant and intransigent among
the federalist group might refuse to consider amendments which were entirely
reasonable. To steer through this perilous strait, he must study his course
carefully, critically, in advance.
WHY SHOULD THE RIGHTS BE DECLARED?
During the previous year, Madison had often exchanged views of the sub-
ject with Thomas Jefferson, who was representing the United States in Paris.
tProfessor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. Reflecting the general expectation, President Washington's message to the First
Congress, delivered April 30, 1759, contained the following:
"Besides the ordinary objects submitted to your care, it will remain with your
judgment to decide how far an exercise of the occasional power delegated by the
fifth article of the Constitution, is rendered expedient at the present juncture, by
the nature of objections which have been urged against the system, or by the detr~e
of inquietude which has given birth to them. Instead of undertaking particular
recommendations on this subject, in which I could be guided by no lights derived
from official opportunities, I shall again give way to my entire confidence in your
discernment and pursuit of the public good: for, I assure myself, that whilst yo u
carefully avoid every alteration which might endanger the benefits of a united and
effective Government, or which ought to await the future' lessons of experience; a
reverence for the characteristic rights of freemen, and a regard for the public har-
mony, will sufficiently influence your deliberations on the question, how far the for-
mer can be more impregnably fortified, or the latter be safely and advantageously
promoted."
1 ANNALS op CoNG. 28-29 (1789).
FIRSTNESS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
From the first, Jefferson had insisted that "a bill of rights is what the people
are entitled to against every government on earth .... *2 Now it was fitting
to tell him that his demand would be met. Under these circumstances, on
October 17, 1788, Madison composed a letter of self-examination and self-
revelation. In it he announced the withdrawal of his early objections 3 to a
declaration of rights, and proceeded to conduct a conscious search for the
doctrines and practical criteria he would use to guide his course in the Con-
gress.
Madison still believed-as he had from the beginning of the correspondence
-that since the real power in a republic resides in the people, it is they who
are the main source of danger to freedom. Solemn declarations still seemed
to him like "parchment barriers," for "in Virginia, I have seen the [state]
bill of rights violated in every instance where it has been opposed to a popular
current."'4 Well, then, was it all to be a pious fraud, which he would only
compound by proposing solemn amendments to the forthcoming Congress?
No, Madison said, addressing simultaneously his distant friend and his own
conscience:
"What use, then, it may be asked can a bill of rights serve in popular
Governments? I answer, the two following which, though less essential
than in other Governments, sufficiently recommend the precaution: 1.
The political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees
the character of fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they
become incorporated with the National sentiment, counteract the impulses
of interest and passion. 2. Although it be generally true, as above stated,
that the danger of oppression lies in the interested majorities of the people
rather than in usurped acts of the Government, yet there may be occasions
on which the evil may spring from the latter source; and on such, a bill
of rights will be a good ground for an appeal to the sense of the com-
munity. Perhaps, too, there may be a certain degree of danger, that a
succession of artful and ambitious rulers may by gradual and well-timed
advances, finally erect an independent Government on the subversion of
liberty. Should this danger exist at all, it is prudent to guard against it,
especially when the precaution can do no injury."' ;
2. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, December 20, 1787. 6 THE WRIT-
has OF THOMxAS JEFFERSON 385 (Memorial ed. 1904). Jefferson sent an edited copy of
this famous letter to Uriah Forrest on December 31, 1787, with leave to use it "but with-
out quoting its author." 5 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 379 (Federal ed. 1904).
For a splendid account of developments leading to adoption of the Bill of Rights, see the
third volume of Irving Brant's definitive biography, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE
CONSTITUTION 1787-1800 (1950), particularly chapter XXI.
3. At Philadelphia and in the ensuing debates, The Federalist had developed a stand-
ard list of reasons why a bill of rights did not belong in the new Constitution. Hamilton's
arguments in THE FEDERALIST No. 84 may be taken as representative.
4. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1788. 1 LETTERS
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 424 (Rives ed. 1865).
5. 1 id. at 426-27.
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This letter, which was delayed in some strange fashion,6 gave Jefferson
rather less comfort than the prevailing party may expect in an argument be-
tween friends. He seems to have wondered why Madison had paraded so
much subtlety to refute a list of obviously false objections. On March 15, 1789,
Jefferson replied. Somewhat lightly, he complimented Madison for conceiving
bright answers to what he apparently considered very dull questions. He added
several summary answers-or rather, retorts--of his own. Here is a sample:
"4. 'Experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights.' True. But
though it is not absolutely efficacious under all circumstances, it is of
great potency always, and rarely inefficacious. A brace the more will
often keep up the building which would have fallen, with that brace the
less. There is a remarkable difference between the characters of the in-
conveniences which attend a declaration of rights, and those which attend
the want of it. The inconveniences of the declaration are, that it may
cramp government in its useful exertions. But the evil of this is short-
lived, moderate and reparable. The inconveniences of the want of a dec-
laration are permanent, afflicting and irreparable." 7
Not satisfied with merely elaborating Madison's defenses and replies, Jeffer-
son went on to urge what he considered the affirmative side of the case. For
the first time in the course of the transatlantic dialogue, he came to assert:
"In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit one
which has great weight with me; the legal check which it puts into the
hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which, if rendered independent
and kept strictly to their own department, merits great confidence for their
learning and integrity. In fact, what degree of confidence would be too
much, for a body composed of such men as Wythe, Blair and Pendleton ?
On characters like these, the 'civiu ardor prava jubentium' [frenzy of
the citizens bidding what is wrong] 9 would make no impression.'"
Thus Jefferson opened his mind. First, an explicit declaration of rights was
indispensable because it would furnish the judiciary with a "legal check" on
aggressions against liberty. Second, to perform their function, judges must be
"rendered independent." Third, the judges must be kept "strictly to their own
department.""I Fourth, good judges would be men of "learning and integrity"
6. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, March 15, 1789. 7 THE WRITINcS
OF THOMAs JEFFERSON 309 (Memorial ed. 1904).
7. 7 id. at 311, (Inner quotation marks added.)
8. These eminent judges constituted at that time Virginia's High Court of Chancery.
See David J. Mays' monumental biography, EDMUND PENDLETON 1721-1803, vol. 2, at 156
(1952). For information about John Blair on the Supreme Court, see 1 WARREN, THL
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 38, 70-71, 141 (rev. ed. 1932).
9. The quotation is from HoRAcE's ODES, bk. III, ode iii.
10. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, March 15, 1789. 7 THE WaIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 309 (Memorial ed. 1904).
1.1. This is an interesting qualification, for in his letter of December 20, 1787, he had
expressed a preference for associating the judges in the President's veto power or investing
them "separately with a similar power." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison.
6 id. at 387.
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(like Wythe, Blair and Pendleton), whose characters would stand firm amid
the storms of popular passion.
How fortunate for the constitutional dignity and efficacy of the Bill of Rights
that Madison was required to wait until June 8, 1789, before addressing the
Congress on the subject! By that time, when the House of Representatives
at long last turned its attention to the proposed amendments, Jefferson's
critically important letter had arrived in New York.
12
In his principal speech, Madison told the House candidly that he still con-
sidered the popular community as the locus of greatest power, hence of great-
est danger, in a republic. Nevertheless, he said, even if constitutional guaran-
tees would be only "paper barriers," they might at least enlighten public
opinion and inculcate respect for individual rights.1 3 With these mild currents
running through it, his speech was bound to be a tepid one. It was one thing
to paraphrase Jefferson and quite another to share his felt convictions. 14 Madi-
son sounded conciliatory, reasonable, and rather detached. He seemed to doubt
that even a limited protection could be devised against the people's unreason-
ing heat and violence. While it was quite intelligent of him to suggest that
constitutional guarantees might serve as educational precepts for the com-
munity, he apparently failed to recognize that the precepts would be driven
home only if court decisions would enforce them. For if the guarantees were
destined to be ignored in court, they would become very ineffectual pedagogues
of republican ideals; worse yet, they would provoke mockery and cynicism. At
bottom, I think Madison tended during this period of his development to under-
estimate-as Jefferson did not-the profound adverseness of interest between
12. According to Mr. Brant, "All of Jefferson's private letters came by diplomatic pouch,
and a dispatch of March 15 to Foreign Secretary Jay was received on June 2." Letter
from Irving Brant to Edmond Cahn, October 18, 1955. I follow Mr. Brant in attributing
this part of Madison's presentation to Jefferson's letter to him of March 15, 1789. See 3
BRANT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 267.
13. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 455 (1789).
14. A week later, on June 17, 1789, in the extended debate on the President's power
to remove appointive officers without legislative concurrence, Madison said:
"It is therefore a fair question, whether this great point may not as well be decided,
at least by the whole Legislature as by a part, by us as well as by the Executive
or Judiciary? As I think it will be equally constitutional, I cannot imagine it will
be less safe, that the exposition should issue from the legislative authority than any
other; and the more so, because it involves in the decision the opinions of both those
departments, whose powers are supposed to be affected by it. Besides, I do not see
in what way this question could come before the judges, to obtain a fair and solemn
decision; but even if it were the case that it could, I should suppose, at least while the
Government is not led by passion, disturbed by faction, or deceived by any discolored
medium of sight, but while there is a desire to all to see and be guided by the
benignant ray of truth, that the decision may be made with the most advantage by
the Legislature itself."
1 id. at 520-21. This presents an unintended but nonetheless excellent summary of the
reasons for referring justiciable constitutional issues to the judges at all times after
June, 1789.
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the governors and the governed in any political society (except only the direct,
participating self-government of a town meeting).
Nevertheless, in presenting the proposed amendments to Congress, Madison
did declare the momentous doctrine he had derived from Jefferson's letter. Not
having assimilated it entirely, he expressed it on this occasion with a mechani-
cal absoluteness which was not characteristic of him. He mentioned no quali-
fications. The First Congress was frankly and explicitly informed that the
sponsors of the Bill of Rights expected the judges to "consider themselves in
a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights."' I Madison told the House:
"If they [the rights] are incorporated into the constitution, indepen-
dent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against
every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated
for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.' 16
A CURIOUS DEBATE: SHOULD THERE BE A Bill OF RIGHTS?
At this stage, one might expect that chance, having postponed Madison's
principal address until Jefferson's letter arrived, had fulfilled its role and would
withdraw from the narrative. But there was another unpredictable happening
ahead, which would have momentous consequences in constitutional law. The
episode was as brief as it was strange.
In view of the novelty of the amendment provisions in Article V of the
Constitution, Madison may well have entertained doubts as to the proper mode
of proceeding.' 7 Nevertheless, by June 8th when he addressed the Congress,
he had a definite method to propose: The way to amend the Constitution was
to insert new matter in the appropriate places of the existing text and simply
replace old words and phrases with the new words and phrases that would
supersede them. People had been complaining that certain safeguards should
have been included in the Philadelphia document; very well, let that be done
now by incorporating the provisions where it was claimed they had belonged
from the start. This was Madison's interpretation of the amending procedure
contemplated under Article V.
In the episode Madison's chief adversary was to be old Roger Sherman,
experienced, skillful, "as cunning as the Devil."' 8 On June 8, 1789, Judge
Sherman was satisfied to take the floor briefly and express his general opposi-
tion to a bill of rights. He saw no need for one; moreover, only time and ex-
15. 1 id. at 457.
16. Ibid.
17. As late as May 27th, 1789, there was still a note of uncertainty on this score.
Madison wrote Jefferson on that day, "A Bill of rights, incorporated, perhaps, into the
Constitution, will be proposed .... ." 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
473 (Rives ed. 1865).
18. The phrase was Jeremiah Wadsworth's. 17 DICTIONARY OF AmERICAN BIOGRAPHY
90 (Malone ed. 1935).
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perience would show what specific amendments were desirable. Since Con-
necticut, his state, had not insisted on a bill of rights as a condition to ratifying
the Constitution, Sherman's position was entirely comfortable. He let matters
take their course until August 13th, when the committee appointed in June to
consider proposed amendments brought in its report.
At this juncture, Sherman rose to insist "We ought not to interweave our
propositions into the work itself, because it will be destructive of the whole
fabric"; and he moved that all amendments be made by way of addition and
supplement to the existing constitutional text.19 The motion precipitated a long
and intricate debate. Mviadison's chief interest was in avoiding further delay;
the difference between the two procedures, he insisted, was only a matter of
form; Sherman's motion would "so far unhinge the business, as to occasion
alterations in every article and clause of the report."20 Some very penetrating
arguments having been exchanged, Sherman's motion was voted on and de-
feated. Apparently this setback did not dismay the old judge, who knew well
that the first vote is not always the decisive one. When on August 19th the
House again considered the amendments as a committee of the whole, Sherman
renewed his motion. After what amounted to a repetition of the earlier debate,
the motion was carried by two-thirds of the House.21 Madison acquiesced,
and the Sherman procedure became a permanently established constitutional
practice.
In certain respects, the episode could hardly have been more paradoxical.
Had it not been for Roger Sherman's insistence, our basic guarantees would
have been sprayed over the constitutional text instead of being assembled in a
single, integrated bill of rights. One would think it fairly apparent that a dec-
laration of rights could exert greater educational influence on the general
population if it was adopted in a unitary and consecutive form. Yet Madison,
e-,pounder of the importance of community opinion and the educational value
of written guarantees, did not perceive this at all. On the opposite side, we
find equal incongruity. Roger Sherman, who declared himself opposed to the
libertarian amendments, nevertheless recommended-and achieved-the very
amendatory procedure best suited to invest them with life and force. I suggest
that, in Sherman's case, it was the pull of professional experience and crafts-
manship that overcame competing motivations. He seems to have reasoned, in
effect, that if the laymen were resolved to have their written guarantees, the
lawyers must at least show them the proper and artificial way to go about it.
As we know, the assembling of the guarantees in a unified Bill did con-
siderably more than increase their educational value. In constitutional law,
the impact of Roger Sherman's motion was to prove momentous and perma-
nent. It introduced a new factor in the theory of civil liberties, for it conferred
contextuality on the first ten amendments.
19. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 734-35 (1789).
20. 1 id. at 740.
21. 1 id. at 795.
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This attribute of contextuality has influenced whole areas of later constitu-
tional doctrine. Consider, for example, the long period during which the Su-
preme Court used the Tenth Amendment as the avenue of approach to other
portions of the Bill of Rights. (Under Madison's proposal, the basic guaran-
tees would have been tucked away in sections 6, 9 and 10 of Article I and
section 2 of Article III; and what was to become the Tenth Amendment
would have stood far away from them in an Article VII.) 22 Again, consider
the decisions of the most recent years, those of the decade since World War
II. In several of these, the specific prohibitions of the Bill of Rights have been
treated as though they were mere adjuncts to the Due Process Clause's over-
all requirement of reasonableness. Whether it was the arm of destiny or the
finger of partisanship or only the impulse of professional competence that pre-
vailed in Congress along with Roger Sherman, the forces he set moving in the
summer of 1789 are more active and prominent today than ever. The laissez
faire jurists of our time choose the Due Process Clause as their habitual per-
spective position, while the libertarian jurists usually prefer a much firmer
point of vantage; nevertheless, both groups follow the practice of construing
the first ten amendments as a unified, organic text. That is how, within the
framework of the Bill of Rights, it has become possible to speak of the func-
tional "firstness" of this or that particular amendment.
MAY THE RIGHTS BE GRADED?
Point by point, we have so far identified historical archetypes for articles in
the libertarian creed of our own time: (a) the declaration of explicit consti-
tutional guarantees, (b) the reliance on judges for enforcement within the
orbit of their competence, and (c) the adherence to a unified Bill of Rights.
Except for one important element, our picture shows that a libertarian jurist
of the present day-for example, Justice Hugo L. Black-may claim continuity
with the original republican tradition. A critical element, however, remains
for testing. The question is: Are there also eighteenth century precedents to
sanction modern libertarians in grading the respective guarantees?
Here we have the central battleground where current philosophies meet and
clash. If a judge responds to the contextuality of the Bill of Rights by read-
ing the whole Bill in terms of the Due Process Clause, he may construe other
clauses, which contain absolute prohibitions, as though they merely specified
and illustrated an over-all criterion of reasonableness; and he may go much
farther. His approach will prompt him to conclude that that is reasonable
which the legislature has, by enacting it, found to be reasonable. Of course,
this conclusion is not at all incompatible with bewailing what, in a particular
instance, the legislature has seen fit to do; judicial opinions of the laissez faire
school are often accompanied by hand-wringing, some of which is quite sincere.
But the result is nonetheless to make the texture of First Amendment rights
look just as porous as the Due Process Clause.
22. 1 id. at 451-53.
[Vol. 65:464
FIRSTNESS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
For several years past, Justice Black has struggled resolutely against the
laissez faire trend. 23 Like other libertarian judges, he believes the Constitution
confers a "preferred position" on certain guaranteed rights as against others.
When governmental action restricts freedom of religion, or speech, or the
press, or assembly, he refuses to let it pour at will through the wide meshes
of due process. He too has been affected by the contextuality of the Bill of
Rights, but with results very different from those of the laissez faire school.
Since his attitude toward personal liberty is formed by the flat prohibitory
language of the First Amendment, he approaches even the subordinate provisions
of other amendments in a stiffer mood. For example, in Justice Black's axi-
ology, the privilege against self-incrimination, instead of being linked to the
Due Process Clause, its Fifth Amendment neighbor, is valued as a defense and
practical implement for First Amendment freedoms. The whole philosophy
rests on assigning the various guarantees to distinct classes and grades. Does
the tradition furnish any precedent for this process of grading?
Before attempting an answer, it wvould be advisable to pause for a moment
and take counsel. Suppose the answer should be affirmative. Suppose we
should find some clear and persuasive eighteenth century precedents. Would
that circumstance control the Court's jurisprudence today, over a century and
a half later? I should say, assuredly not. I do not think the American people
unseated George III with a view to putting history in his place. The Bill of
Rights is a national inheritance precisely because it has passed again and again
from the dead to the living-to be used as the living find best, re-interpreted in
the using, then passed along to the succeeding generation. To agree with what
Jefferson and Madison may have intended or may have communicated to the
Congress is only a comfort, not an obligation. If, in the considered judgment
of our time, the process of grading the rights is found to fill the immediate and
the long-term needs of civil freedom, we certainly ought to grade them, what-
ever the eighteenth century would have done.
But to say these things does not amount to dismissing the past. If a liber-
tarian ought not to brandish the history of the Bill of Rights like a sword or
recline on it like a couch, he may at least present it before him like a shield.
If he should be charged with inventing a new constitutional doctrine, he may
properly show that he is only maintaining a very old one; and even if he should
be convicted of deviating from Brandeis, he may still make bold to submit that
he is returning to Jefferson. Laissez faire jurists have assigned historical argu-
ments, among others, for treating all the rights as though they had a uniform
texture. The idea of grading, they contend, ought to be abandoned because it
is a recent innovation in the theory of civil liberties. By way of comment on
the argument, it is worthwhile to look at three quick tableaux.
First Tableau. The year is 1787 or 1788; the place is Paris. Thomas Paine
has just returned to his quarters after a long talk with Jefferson. Too excited
to rest, he sits down and writes:
23. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 268-70, 274-75 (1952) (dissenting opinion);
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 650 (1951) (same) ; Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (same).
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"After I got home, being alone and wanting amusement I sat down to
explain to myself (for there is such a thing) my Ideals of natural and
civil rights and the distinction between them-I send them to you to see
how nearly we agree.
"Suppose 20 persons, strangers to each other, to meet in a country
not before inhabited. Each would be a sovereign in his own natural right.
His will would be his Law,--but his power, in many cases, inadequate to
his right, and the consequence would be that each might be exposed, not
only to each other but to the other nineteen.
"It would then occur to them that their condition would be much im-
proved, if a way could be devised to exchange that quantity of danger into
so much protection, so that each individual should possess the strength
of the whole number. As all their rights, in the first case, are natural
rights, and the exercise of those fights supported only by their own nat-
ural individual power, they would begin by distinguishing between these
rights they could individually exercise fully and perfectly and those they
could not.
"Of the first kind are the rights of thinking, speaking, forming and giv-
ing opinions, and perhaps all those which can be fully exercised by the
individual without the aid of exterior assistance-or in other words, rights
of personal competency-Of the second kind are those of personal protec-
tion of acquiring and possessing property, in the exercise of which the in-
dividual natural power is less than the natural right.
"Having drawn this line they agree to retain individually the first Class
of Rights or those of personal Competency; and to detach from their
personal possession the second Class, or those of defective power and to
accept in lieu thereof a right to the whole power produced by a conden-
sation of all the parts. These I conceive to be civil rights or rights of
Compact, and are distinguishable from Natural rights, because in the one
we act wholly in our own person, in the other we agree not to do so, but
act under the guarantee of society."
'24
The notions Paine expressed were not nearly so novel as he imagined. I
should suggestghat it was John Locke who transmitted the pattern-not in his
Second Treatise of Civil Government, where scholars have searched in vain
for any grading of basic rights, but in his Essay Conccrnzing Human Under-
standing. In the latter, Locke (who may have been prompted in turn by
Robert Boyle, the eminent chemist and philosopher of nature) had supplied
a model of physical and metaphysical classification which his eighteenth cen-
tury American admirers could easily adopt and use for their political theories.
According to Locke the qualities of any body are either "primary," like
solidity, extension, figure and mobility, which "are utterly inseparable from
the body, in what estate soever it be" ; or "secondary," like colors, sounds and
tastes, which are only "powers to produce various sensations in us by their
printary qualities.' '2- For the educated men of the Enlightenment, it would be
24. G. CHINARD, THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE APOSTLE OF AIERICANISM 80-81 (2d ed.,
rev. ed. 1948).
25. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, bk. II, c. VIII. See also
id., bk. II, c. XXX; bk. IV, c. III; bk. IV, c. VI. Later criticism has refuted the pattvrn
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a short leap from Locke's grade of "primary" and "inseparable" qualities to
Paine's corresponding "natural rights of personal competency"; or from
Locke's grade of "secondary" and affective qualities to Paine's corresponding
"rights of compact" which arise in civil society. One need only change "any
body" in Locke's text to "anybody," and the rest of the pattern emerges.
Second Tableau. We are back in New York on June 8, 1789, where Madi-
son is expounding the Bill of Rights to the House of Representatives. Far
from considering the rights all of one piece, grade and texture, he classifies and
re-classifies them like a virtuoso of the taxonomic art. First, he classifies the
rights in order to distinguish the American problem from the English experi-
ence with Magna Charta. Magna Charta, he says, furnishes no answer because
it "does not contain any one provision for the security of those rights, respect-
ing which the people of America are most alarmed. '26 He refers here to "the
freedom of the press and rights of conscience" as "those choicest privileges of
the people."2 7
Then he re-classifies the various rights in terms of their origins. If one
analyzes bills of rights, one will find:
"In some instances they assert those rights which are exercised by the
people in forming and establishing a plan of Government. In other in-
stances, they specify those rights which are retained when particular
powers are given up to be exercised by the Legislature. In other instances,
they specify positive rights, which may seem to result from the nature of
the compact. Trial by jury cannot be considered as a natural right, but
a right resulting from a social compact which regulates the action of the
community, but is as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any
one of the pre-existent rights of nature.
28
A few minutes later, he proposes still another order for grading the rights.
Some guarantees are asserted against the executive, others against the legis-
lative branch; some against the federal government as a whole, others against
the state governments. Since however the greatest danger, as he believed, lay
in the democratic community, the "prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to
be levelled in that quarter." 2 This third method of classifying, based on the
,ources and directions from which civil liberties may be menaced, is prob-
ably more representative of Madison's personal thinking than the other two.
Yet, in his judgment, the result would not vary: the freedoms embodied in
the First Amendment must always secure paramountcy.30
for physical, metaphysical and epistemological purposes, but its utility as a political para-
digm may remain unimpaired.
26. 1 ANNALs or CONG. 453 (1789).
27. Ibid.
28. 1 id. at 454.
29. Ibid.
30. In Mr. Brant's view, Madison's original resistance to a bill of rights was due to
his apprehension "that limitations of language and public opinion might render the basic
freedom, that of religion, too narrow for security. If it were infringed, prejudice and
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Third Tableau. A year and a half later. Having assumed the office of
Secretary of State, Jefferson is now in Philadelphia. From Hartford, Noah
Webster has sent copies of his Essays, one for the Secretary of State to file
for copyright protection, one for Jefferson to add to his personal library. On
reading the Essays, which are dated "New York 1788," Jefferson finds that
Vebster has taken him to task for advocating the adoption of a bill of rights.
On December 4th, 1790, in a letter replete with tact and thoughtfulness, Jeff-
erson writes:
"A desire of being set right in your opinion, which I respect too much
not to entertain that desire, induces me to hazard to you the following
observations. It had become an universal and almost uncontroverted
position in the several States, that the purposes of society do not require
a surrender of all our rights to our ordinary governors: that there are
certain portions of right not necessary to enable them to carry on an
effective government, and which experience has nevertheless proved they
will be constantly encroaching on, if submitted to them; that there are also
certain fences which experience has proved peculiarly efficacious against
wrong, and rarely obstructive of right, which yet the governing powers
have ever shown a disposition to weaken and remove. Of the first kind,
for instance, is freedom of religion; of the second, trial by jury, habeas
corpus laws, free presses. These were the settled opinions of all the States,
-of that of Virginia, of which I was writing, as well as of the others."31
He went on to call the first class "unceded portions of right" and the second
class "fences against wrong."'32
In classifying freedom of the press along with other "fences against wrong,"
it is not likely that Jefferson intended to derogate from the press's station and
dignity as a means of free personal expression. In any case, we need not in-
quire now whether Jefferson's mode of grading was valid in 1790. For our
purposes, it is enough to record that like others of his era he did grade the
various guarantees and that, in grading them, he awarded primacy to the free-
doms of conscience and personal expression.
Thus the judicial libertarianism of the American present is securely linked
with a very old and genuine tradition. In insisting on the firstness of the First
Amendment, modern thinkers like Hugo Black are continuing and advancing
the American vision of a good society. Popular majorities being what they
often are and acting as they often do, the libertarian tradition requires an ex-
traordinarily patient, if not obstinate, fortitude. Recently Justice Black sum-
marized the credo: "In my judgment, the very heart of the Bill of Rights is
the First Amendment. Unless people can freely exercise those liberties, with-
intolerance would tear down everything else." Mr. Brant concludes, "Charged with the
task of drawing a bill of rights, the very apprehensions which made him hesitate spurred
him to superlative performance." 3 BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 275 (1950).
31. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster, December 4, 1790. 8 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 112 (Memorial ed. 1904).
32. Ibid.
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out loss of good name, job, property, liberty or life, a good society cannot
exist. That is my faith."'33
THE AIIENDMENT IN BLACK LETTER, WRIT LARGE
It is time now to consider Hugo Black's personal contribution. Has he
given anything of his own to the tradition; in what respects, if any, has he
moved it forward? Before attempting to list the answers, let us first summon
his sense of humor and native clemency, for if we are about to misread or mis-
construe his thinking, only the former will console him and only the latter will
rescue us. With these our guardians, we proceed to epitomize.
Emphasis on Text and Texture. Not very many years ago, it was modish in
sophisticated liberal circles to insist that the Court ought to apply the literal
text of the Constitution, as distinguished from various judge-made phrases,
concepts and glosses. Only by adhering to the text, liberals were wont to
argue, could the Court reconcile its own power of judicial review with the
democratic postulate of majority rule; only thus could it exercise the self-dis-
cipline needed for wise adjudication. No one has taken these once-popular
admonitions more seriously than Hugo Black. To him the language of the
Constitution is more than a source of law, it is the only authentic commission of
his office. Hence, when he comes to consider the Bill of Rights, he insists that
the Court pay due regard to differences of tenor and mood in the several pro-
visions-in short, that contextuality must not prevail to the extent of eliminat-
ing textuality.
On this reasoning, none of the schemes we have mentioned for classifying
and grading the guarantees would quite suit his purpose. He would be inclined
to prefer a more textual criterion for grading. And he has found one in
Madison's famous phrase, likewise in the speech of June 8, 1789, distinguish-
ing fields "in which the Government ought not to act" from fields in which it
ought "to act only in a particular mode."'3 4 According to Justice Black, the
language of the First Amendment belongs unmistakably to the former cate-
gory: it tells the authorities not to act at all. By way of contrast, the pro-
hibition of "unreasonable" searches (Fourth Amendment) and the Due Pro-
cess Clause (Fifth Amendment) contemplate that the authorities may act if
only they act reasonably. To exclude absolutely is one thing; to admit yet
require reasonableness is another.
Against these views of Justice Black's, it has been objected that the First
Amendment's guarantee of free expression has never been taken so literally
as to grant immunity from civil liability for libel or slander. If there are con-
33. Commencement Address by Justice Black at Swarthmore College, June 6, 1955.
34. Madison said, "But whatever may be the form which the several States have
adopted in making declarations in favor of particular rights, the great object in view is
to limit the powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases
in which the Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode." 1 ANNALS
Or CONG. 454 (1789). An excerpt is quoted by Justice Black in his dissent in Feldman
v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 501 (1944).
1956]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ceded "exceptions" of this kind, do they not prove that the seemingly rigid
First Amendment must be subjected to an emollient of "reasonableness"?
Does not "reasonableness" pervade our entire juridical order? Certainly Jus-
tice Black has not contended that the sponsors of the First Amendment ex-
pected it to end civil actions for defamation. I understand he would freely
grant the existence of this "exception."
He would probably go on to respond that civil remedies for defamation are
not only consistent with but were considered by the founding libertarians as
virtually essential to the maintenance of free speech and press.- Exceptions
of this type, existing and recognized in 1789, may be allowed as implicit in the
First Amendment so long as, on re-examination in later epochs, they can be
found still compatible with the main guarantees of the text. But-he would
likely add-the operation of "reasonableness" factors was exhausted by ex-
ceptions of vintage 1789. Save only for these, the solemn text of the Amend-
ment declares precisely what the American commonwealth has decided to call
"reasonable." The decision having been made and declared once for all, there
remains no further factor of "reasonableness" for the Congress or the Court
to evaluate. It follows that what may have been a litigable question of reason-
ableness ante the First Amendment has been taken out of the judicial province
post the Amendment. The judges' commissions simply do not authorize them
to conduct inquiries within this area. If they re-open the closed question of
reasonableness, they become chargeable with a usurpation.
Emphasis on the Hither Side of the 'Fences'. As has been noticed, Thomas
Jefferson, writing to Noah Webster, classified the basic guarantees into "un-
ceded portions of right" and "fences against wrong," and mentioned trial by
jury, habeas corpus and free presses as examples of the "fences." Here he
expressed quite fairly the libertarian mind of his time. In that era, the press-
which twentieth century thought tends to associate with other forms of free
personal expression-was valued primarily for its function as political cen-
sor.36 Free presses were desired because they supplied the community with
independent critics and censors of the government. With all their faults, they
could nevertheless act like barriers against official tramps, trespassers and
arsonists. This was the libertarian attitude that Jefferson espoused. As trial
by jury and habeas corpus stood like fences to ward off official abuses, so too
might the institution of press freedom. The fact that the governors were roving
about on the far side of the fences was sufficient for him.
From the beginning, it has been evident that the "fences" themselves need
unremitting attention and defense. In every generation they are gashed and
rammed and undermined, often under a pretext of mending or modernizing
them. As long as the fences continue to be appreciated only in a negative sense
-as stockades against the forces on the far side instead of safeguards for the
35. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, August 28, 1789. 7 THE aVrVT-
INGS OF THoMAs JEFFERsoN 444 (Memorial ed. 1904).
36. See the proud claim on this score asserted in 1774 by the Continental Congress in
its "Address to the People of Quebec." 1 JOURNALs OF CONGRESS 58 (1777).
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values on the hither side-popular support for them will probably remain
flabby, uninformed, and at best spasmodic. Our generation has had ample
opportunity to observe that when an administration (like Franklin D. Roose-
velt's or Dwight D. Eisenhower's) gains popular approval of its major objec-
tives, the majority of Americans do not understand why they need feel con-
cern about inherited rules of court procedure or other refinements of method.
If, as libertarians insist, the First Amendment guaraitees are the really vital
ones, have not these been separated and distinguished from the list of pro-
cedural "fences"? Even should the fences sway and sag here and there, civil
liberty does not inhere in them but in the "unceded portions of right." By such
reasoning, people who feel deeply attached to the First Amendment may come
to vilipend one or another provision in the Fifth, Sixth, or Eighth. Does the
firstness of the First Amendment imply unimportance of the remainder?
Hugo Black has given his answer by turning attention to the inner side of
the fences. XVe have understood what it is the fences are intended to exclude;
he asks that we also appreciate what they are placed there to protect. In his
view, the firstness of the First Amendment, far from diminishing the others,
works to enhance their importance. He explains:
"The first of the ten amendments erected a Constitutional shelter for
the people's liberties of religion, speech, press, and assembly. This amend-
mcnt reflects the faith that a good society is not static but advancing, and
that the fullest possible interchange of ideas and beliefs is essential to
attainment of this goal. The proponents of the First Amendment, com-
mitted to this faith, were determined that every American should possess
an unrestrained freedom to express his views, however odious they might
be to vested interests whose power they might challenge.
"But these men were not satisfied that the First Amendment would
make this right sufficiently secure. As they well knew, history teaches
that attempted exercises of the freedoms of religion, speech, press, and
assembly have been the commonest occasions for oppression and perse-
cution: Inevitably such persecutions have involved secret arrests, unlaw-
ful detentions, forced confessions, secret trials, and arbitrary punishments
under oppressive laws. Therefore it is not surprising that the men be-
hind the First Amendment also insisted upon the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments, designed to protect all individuals against arbitrary punish-
ment by definite procedural provisions guaranteeing fair public trials by
juries. They sought by these provisions to assure that no individual could
be punished except according to 'due process,' by which they certainly
intended that no person could be punished except for a violation of definite
and validly enacted laws of the land, and after a trial conducted in accord-
ance with the specific procedural safeguards written in the Bill of Rights.
If occasionally these safeguards worked to the advantage of an ordinary
criminal, that was a price they were willing to pay for the freedom they
cherished."' 37
Here the Bill of Rights is revealed anew, in a fresh and original perspec-
tive. Suddenly the sections fall into their destined places, and a grand organic
design stands out. The "fences," we see, do much more than channel, control
37. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 501-02 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
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or obstruct the currents of official action. They constitute the indispensable
ministers and defenders of First Amendment freedom. Without them, the
promises of free worship, speech and press become a mockery. In Justice
Black's view, a legislative, executive or judicial mandate that impairs the
guarantee of trial by jury or the privilege against self-incrimination puts every
substantive liberty-including liberty of conscience-in jeopardy. If Ameri-
cans are resolved to remain free, they will defend these fences as uncompromis-
ingly as, in former times, citizens would defend their city walls.
The Ideal of an Edified Society. Now we have reached Justice Black's most
creative contribution to the theory of the First Amendment. In the course of
the great dialogue between Madison and Jefferson about the desirability of a
bill of rights, neither correspondent took a naively exalted view of the demo-
cratic community. Madison saw in it the chief source of danger to civil liberty;
Jefferson, while urging the people's case for guarantees against official op-
pression, was concerned more with safeguarding the elementary rights of in-
dividuals than with raising the level of the social group. 38 Dwelling as he did
in Paris and attending successive stages of the incipient French Revolution,
he fully recognized the risks and evils of democracy. He referred to them in
Horace's tidy phrase, "cizium ardor prava jubenthmi" [frenzy of the citizens
bidding what is wrong], and when he quoted Horace to Madison, it was not
French but American behavior that was under consideration. In Jefferson's
outlook of 1788-1790, a nation's claim to a declaration of rights could not be
made to depend on the people's proving their discipline, wisdom or judgment.
Since every government tended in some degree to encroach on basic liberties,
all should be required to subscribe to solemn guarantees. Barricades in the
Paris streets and Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts were lively incidents, true.
but any American who considered them impediments to a bill of rights must
be either congenitally timorous or disingenuous. The focus ought to be placed
and kept on the faults and wrongdoings of the governors.
It has been very difficult for First Amendment theory to move beyond this
point. From the beginning, the Supreme Court has declined to determine
questions of constitutionality unless the person seeking the decision could
show he had legal standing to sue. When the rights in issue pertain to the
First Amendment, the Court has expected to hear appeals from the individuals
who were molested in their worship, or arrested for their speech or censored
or impeded in their printing, or prevented from assembling to petition for
38. Of course, Jefferson was profoundly interested in popular education. Opening the
Great Dialogue with Madison, he freely asserted he was "not a friend to a very energetic
government" because it generally led to despotism; then by way of emphasis through con-
trast, he pointed to the sound judgment that could be expected from an informed people
(at least so long as it retained an agricultural base). Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison, December 20, 1787. 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 391-92
(Memorial ed. 1904). But as will be seen, it remained for Justice Black to confer jural
status on the community's First Amendment right to receive intelligence, to learn and to
advance.
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redress of grievances. If a person's own rights had been injured, he could
sue; otherwise not.
How, then, was the general community likely to come into view under this
system? In only two ways: (a) in the course of denying a plea for some First
Amendment freedom, the community might be pictured as susceptible to pro-
vocation, or seditious influence, or corruption; or (b) the community, repre-
sented by its duly constituted officials, might be before the court to argue for
the validity of a law regulating or repressing some claimed First Amendment
right. In either event, it would always be the individual or group of individ-
uals on one side, speaking on behalf of freedom, and the community officially
or tacitly on the other side, speaking at best for orderliness, quietness or un-
littered streets, and at worst for persecution of unpopular cults and causes.
These circumstances, proper though they were for jurisdictional purposes,
established a badly distorted social background for First Amendment litiga-
tions. Various laissec faire jurists proceeded to exploit the distortion.
They took this extraneous datum, which the Court's own doctrines had
manufactured, and purported to discover in it a pre-established, inflexible
hierarchy of interests. Whoever might come before them as spokesman of First
Amendment freedom was required to be an individual; ergo, his interest was
to be labeled "an individual interest" of one kind or another. On the other
hand, whoever might appear for the government was automatically dubbed the
spokesman of "a public or social interest." Thus, in a typical opinion composed
by a laissea faire judge-despite the parade of precedents and the show of re-
luctance and the business of weighing one interest against another-the whole
question would be begged from the start and the result would be a foregone
conclusion. Rare instances there have been when even such judges have
allowed the so-called "individual interest" to prevail; but in these exceptional
cases one generally finds that ulterior, corrupt motives impelling the prosecu-
tion were simply too obvious to be ignored. In sum, a purported "jurispru-
dence of interests," read anachronistically into the First Amendment, has be-
come a familiar tool of laissez faire. It is quite analogous in its use to the
purported "natural law" that stodgy minds of past eras were accustomed to
read into the Due Process Clause. But while lawyers are generally able today
to see through the old reactionary nomenclature of "natural law" immutables,
a jargon of "weighing the interests" can still take them in.30 The truth of the
matter is that even if two conflicting or competing interests could somehow be
weighed against each other, a judge might "fix" his own scale in half a dozen
different ways before the alleged "weighing" began.
Justice Black has furnished the answer to this game of false balances. In the
celebrated Marsh4 4 and Tucker 41 opinions, among others,42 he presents the
39. See Judge Jerome Frank on these "quantifying" illusions, in The Lawyer's Role
in Modern Society: A Round Table, 4 J. PuB. L. 8, 11 (1955).
40. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
41. Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
42. The rationale of the Marsh opinion had been adumbrated in Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). See also the dissenting opinions cited note 23 supra.
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libertarian ideal of an edified and advancing community. Where would we
really find the principal danger to civil liberty in a republic? Not in the gov-
ernors as governors, not in the governed as governed, but in the governed un-
equipped to function as governors. The chief enemies of republican freedom
are mental sloth, conformity, bigotry, superstition, credulity, monopoly in the
market of ideas, and utter, benighted ignorance. Relying as it does on the con-
sent of the governed, representative government cannot succeed unless the
community receives enough information to grasp public issues and make sen-
sible decisions. As lights which may have been enough for the past do not
meet the needs of the present, so present lights will not suffice for the more
extensive and complex problems of the future. Heretofore public enlighten-
ment may have been only a manifest desideratum; today it constitutes an im-
perative necessity. The First Amendment, says Justice Black, "reflects the
faith that a good society is not static but advancing, and that the fullest possible
interchange of ideas and beliefs is essential to attainment of this goal." 43
If, therefore, judges should still insist on using the nomenclature of "in-
terests," what higher public interest is there than enlightenment of the electors,
and what higher social interest than the intellectual advancement of the com-
munity? Not alone the speaker, missionary, writer or printer, has a stake in
the First Amendment; the whole conglomerate mass of the community audience
is involved,44 including those who are almost sure they will never wish to speak
and those who are completely sure they do not wish to listen. Under Black's
doctrine, no one is required to listen, but even a unanimous unwillingness to
listen does not justify repression, for an advancing society must be free to
revise its judgment on this score as well as on others. The audience has the
indefinitely continuing right to be exposed to an ideological variety; it will not
be heard at any one period of time to renounce exercising the right in other,
future periods.
Justice Black's ideal carries an ambitious compliment for the democratic
audience. He assumes, in effect, that if given access to the various facts and
contentions, the members of the audience are generally rational enough t,
identify, and well-intentioned enough to choose the better, wiser, more bene-
ficial of alternative courses. Or at least, that though this method of political
decision may be faulty, any other method would prove disastrously worse.
Since ancient days when the stubborn backsliding Israelites made life difficult
for Moses, no nation has ever complied satisfactorily with the ordinances of
its finest preceptors; nor, for that matter, has any of the preceptors lived with
perfect consistency on the plane of his own teachings. Yet considerations like
these need not cloud a sincere democratic faith. They only demonstrate that
social progress involves continual striving and that men strive for what lies
43. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 501 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
44. United Nations reports illustrate the extraordinary value of this approach whot
applied to international communication of intelligence. See the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights art. 19, adopted by the General Assembly of thv Unittd NCations 4,,:
December 10, 1948. 6 U.N. BuLL. 6 (1949).
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beyond them rather than for what they already possess. In Justice Black's
hands, the Bill of Rights is directed toward the values that lie beyond. He
reads it as a people's charter of edification, and postulates the kind of national
community whose practices would do daily honor to the First Amendment. It
would be an American community not unworthy of Madison's and Jefferson's
best aspirations.
The practical fulfillment requires certain cultivated traits of mind and char-
acter. They are the traits Jefferson specified to Madison when he recom-
mended looking to the judges to enforce a bill of rights. He cited the names of
Pendleton, Blair and Wythe. The consummate qualities they exemplified in
their generation, Hugo Black exemplifies in ours. When, after mentioning
those great figures, Jefferson went on to quote a phrase out of Horace, he
probably intended to invoke the remainder of the strophe. It sings of justice
and integrity:
Iustum et tenacem propositi virum The just man firm of purpose turns aside
Non civium ardor prava iubentium Neither for fury of the mob in power,
Non vultus instantis tyranni Nor in the presence of the tyrant's pride;
Mente quatit solida, neque Auster .... Nor can the stormy South wind make him
cower .... 45
It is these classic republican virtues that will ultimately maintain the first-
ness of the First Amendment.
45. HortAcE's ODES, bk. III, ode iii, in THE ODES OF HoAcE 82 (Dunsany transl.
1947).
To the Justices of the Supreme Court, the South wind may feel unusually stormy these
days. But informed Americans understand that worthier things than wind come from the
South; and as for the uninformed, they can profit by noting that Alabama produced Hugo
L. Black.
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